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THE IMPERIAL SOVEREIGN:
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY & THE ADA
Judith Olans Brown*
Wendy E. Parmet**
Professors Brown and Parmet examine the impact of the Supreme Court's
resurrection of state sovereign immunity on the rights of individuals protected by
the Americans with Disabilities Act in light of the recent decision, Board of
Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett. Placing Garrett within
the context of the Rehnquist Court's evolving reallocation of state and federal
authority, they argue that the Court has relied upon a mythic and dangerous
notion of sovereignty that is foreign to the Framers' understanding. Brown and
Parmet go on to show that, by determining that federalism compels constraining
congressional power to abrogate sovereign immunity, the Court limits the ability
of individuals with disabilities to obtain federal recourse. They also contend that
the Court's restriction of fora for individuals with disabilities raises significant
separation of powers problems.
Judges, like most of us, embrace ideas that make sense of their
world. They also adopt ideas that promise to provide consistent
guidance for future cases. Unfortunately, judges sometimes forget
that an idea is only an ideal: instead of treating it as an aspiration,
they act as if it were a commandment, supreme and inflexible.
Eventually they begin to feel powerless to control the tumult they
themselves have (unwittingly) unleashed.'
So it has been with the idea of sovereignty.2 This Article explores
the destructive power of this idea: an idea that, although initially
benign, has wreaked havoc in its wake. On February 21, 2001,
loyalty to this idea significantly weakened the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) . On that day, in Board of Trustees of the
* Professor of Law, Emerita, Northeastern University School of Law. A.B. 1962,
Mount Holyoke College; LL.B. 1965, Boston College Law School.
** Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law. B.S. 1979, Cornell Uni-
versity; J.D. 1982, Harvard Law School. The authors wish to thank Cora Ganzglass, Joel G.
Kinney, Eleanor Morton and Laura Moskowitz for their invaluable research assistance and
Jan McNew for her outstanding secretarial support.
1. Idea(l)s of this sort are myths, reductive/seductive simplifications of complex
phenomena that often create an aura of universality and invincibility. In that sense myths
legitimate particular constructions of reality. For a fuller discussion of the nature, power
and theories of mythic thinking, see Judith Olans Brown et al., The Mythogenesis of Gender:
Judicial Images of Women in Paid and Unpaid Labor, 6 UCLA WOMEN's L.J. 457, 457-62 (1996).
2. Professor Prince suggests that the Supreme Court is trapped "because of its ro-
mance with the abstraction of state sovereignty." John Randolph Prince, Caught in a Trap:
The Romantic Reading of the Eleventh Amendment, 48 BUFF. L. REv. 411,412 (2000).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (1994).
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
University of Alabama v. Garrett,4 the Supreme Court held that
Congress acted unconstitutionally when it abrogated the sovereign
immunity of the states by permitting back pay as a remedy for state
violations of Tide I of the ADA.
In this Article we consider the origins and implications of the
Court's decision. In so doing, we take a perspective external to the
5
extant doctrine. The critical issues, in our view, do not relate to
whether the Court was correct given recent case law, but rather
how that precedent came to be the Frankensteinian monster it is
now, and what that means for people with disabilities.
We begin in Part I by tracing the development of the Supreme
Court's newfound concern for state sovereignty and discuss its
culmination in Garrett. In Part II we look more closely at the idea
of sovereignty and show how it has always been more of a myth
than an actuality. In Part III we discuss why a monolithic vision of
sovereignty is foreign to American constitutional thought. In Part
IV we explain why divided sovereignty is critical for the protection
of minority groups, including people with disabilities. In Part V we
extend the discussion of divided sovereignty beyond federalism to
separation of powers and argue that the Supreme Court's new sov-
ereignty doctrine is as much about the assertion of judicial
sovereignty as it is about the protection of states' rights. Once
again, we contend, this demand for monolithic sovereignty threat-
ens the interests of vulnerable people, including those who were to
be protected by the Americans with Disabilities Act.
I. THE ROAD TO GARRETT
Patricia Garrett was the director of nursing for the obstetric-
gynecological services at the University of Alabama.6 In 1994 she
was diagnosed with breast cancer and treated with lumpectomy,
radiation and chemotherapy.7 After she was diagnosed, her em-
ployer threatened to transfer her to a less demanding job.8 She
then took family and medical leave. When she returned she was
4. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
5. For a discussion of the existing doctrine, see infra text accompanying notes 25-92.
6. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 362. The Court also considered a companion case brought by
Milton Ash, security officer with the Alabama Department of Youth Services. Ash had
chronic asthma and sleep apnea. After being denied his request to be reassigned to day
shifts, he filed an ADA claim. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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demoted because of her condition, allegedly in violation of the
ADA. 9
Garrett sued the University under Title I of the ADA. The Uni-
versity's defense was sovereign immunity. Even though the ADA
explicitly provides for a cause of action against the states,' ° the
University claimed that Congress lacked the power to hold it, as a
state actor, accountable against its will."
The specific question before the Supreme Court was whether
Congress had the authority to abrogate Alabama's sovereign
immunity to protect the rights of state workers with disabilities.
2
Writing for a now familiar 5-4 majority,3 Chief Justice Rehnquist
recognized that Congress, in enacting Title I of the ADA, sought to
make states amenable to back pay claims. 4 Relying on several
recent cases, 15 however, the ChiefJustice stated that Congress could
only abrogate state sovereign immunity when it acted pursuant to
its powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 The
majority then concluded that in enacting Title I of the ADA,
Congress exceeded that authority.7 Concurring for himself and
Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy took pains to note the laudable
goals of the ADA, while nevertheless agreeing that the Court's
precedent demanded that Title I's abrogation of sovereign
immunity be found unconstitutional."' Justice Breyer in dissent
focused on the record that Congress amassed in enacting the
ADA.' 9 According to Justice Breyer, the majority "through its
evidentiary demands, its non-deferential review, and its failure to
9. Id.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (1994).
11. The Eleventh Circuit held that the ADA was a valid exercise of Congress' power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and that the University was therefore not
immune from suit under the ADA. See Garrett v. Univ. of Ala., 193 E3d 1214, 1218 (11th Cir.
1999), rev'd, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
12. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363.
13. The Court's recent federalism cases have been remarkable for the consistency of
the five to four alignment of Justices. In almost every case, the majority has consisted of
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas. The dissent
invariably comprises Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. For further analysis of
these coalitions see Judith Olans Brown & Peter D. Enrich, Nostalgic Federalism, 28 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 1, 48-53 (2000).
14. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364 n.3 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (b) (4)).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 57-88.
16. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 364.
17. Id. at 374.
18. Id. (KennedyJ., concurring). Elsewhere we have analyzed Justice O'Connor's atti-
tudes toward people with disabilities. SeeJudith Olans Brown et al., The Rugged Feminism of
Sandra Day O'Connor, 32 IND. L. REv. 1219, 1237-40 (1999).
19. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 377-82 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
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distinguish between judicial and legislative constitutional
competencies, improperly invades a power that the Constitution
assigns to Congress."
20
To appreciate the Justices' arguments and the implications of
the majority's decision, one must look beyond the narrow techni-
calities of sovereign immunity doctrines to a recent series of
separate but related cases pertaining to federalism and separation
of powers. 1 In the last two decades, the Rehnquist Court has re
aligned the relationship between the states and the federal
government, dramatically curtailing congressional power2 2 while
expanding the Court's responsibility to enforce the new limitations
it has set.23 Each discrete doctrinal piece of this strategy initially
emerged as a relatively limited holding in the context of relatively
narrow, indeed rather trivial, facts. Today, however, it appears that
trivial facts, like hard cases, have made bad law. 4
The first doctrine pertains to congressional power under Article
I of the Constitution.25 In the last several years, the Court has re-
20. Id. at 388-89.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 27-36; 71-88.
22. This Article was in press on September 11, 2001 when the World Trade Center and
the Pentagon were attacked by terrorists. It is too early to know whether these horrific
events will alter the course of the Court's federalism doctrine, but they might. In the past,
wars and national crises have served as centrifugal forces, elevating federal supremacy over
concerns for states' rights. See Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1485,
1558 (1994) ("Yet battle has almost always excited an outburst of nationalism that (together
with the nationwide mobilization of resources required to fight) has increased the promi-
nence of the federal government in daily life.").
23. Indeed, the Supreme Court's recent intervention in the 2000 Presidential elec-
tion, Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000), and Bush v. Gore, 531
U.S. 98 (2000), suggests that the assertion ofjudicial supremacy (or of the Court's own sov-
ereignty) may be a more powerful ideal to the current majority than is the protection of
state sovereignty, the issue in Garrett. See infra text accompanying notes 207-230; see also
Herman Schwartz, The Supreme Court s Federalism: A Fig Leaffor Conseruatives, 574 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCl. 119, 129 (2001) (arguing that Bush v. Gore demonstrates that conser-
vatives have used the idea of states' rights for material interests). A less charitable
explanation of Bush v. Gore is that the majority's own ideals, or "higher order politics" have
given way to the lower order politics of partisanship. See Linda Greenhouse, Another Kind of
Bitter Split: When Jurisprudence is Pulled into Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2000, at A-1. In any
event, after Garrett, it is clear that Bush v. Gore does not signal a significant shift in the major-
ity's approach to federalism, and that the majority seems willing to hold to its view that Bush
v. Gore is "limited to the present circumstances." 531 U.S. at 109.
24. See N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1903) (Holmes, J. dissenting)
("Great cases like hard cases make bad law.").
25. The doctrine of sovereign immunity is often associated with the Eleventh
Amendment. The current doctrine, however, has clearly departed from the text (read either
narrowly or broadly) of that amendment. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363-64. Instead the Court
now sees sovereign immunity as a fundamental principle of federalism unanchored to any
particular clause of the Constitution. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) ("[T]he
sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from nor is limited by the terms of the
Eleventh Amendment.").
FALL 2001-WINTER 2002]
treated significantly from more than a half-century of settled un-
derstanding of the broad scope of Congress' commerce power,
which enabled the development of the modem regulatory state.26
Most directly, in United States v. Lopez 27 the Court rejected Con-
gress's attempt to regulate non-commercial transactions on the
theory that they have a substantial impact on interstate com-
merce.2 In effect the Court determined that it was its job to ensure
that Congress did not overstep the bounds of its Article I powers.29
Likewise in United States v. Morrison," the Court struck down the
Violence Against Women Act,"' in part, on the grounds that the
conduct being regulated did not have sufficient economic impact
to justify use of the commerce power.32
Simultaneously, in cases such as New York v. United States3 3 and
Printz v. United States,34 the Court cabined federal legislative author-
ity more indirectly by resurrecting the long dormant Tenth
Amendment as a major barrier against federal "commandeering"
of state officials in the service of national goals. 5 Read together,
these two lines of cases not only realigned federalism in a more
state-centered way but also tipped the separation of powers balance
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see Brown and Enrich, supra note 13, at 11-18, 25-34.
27. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
28. See id. at 551. Respondent in Lopez was a twelfth-grade student at Edison High
School in San Antonio, Texas who was arrested for carrying a concealed weapon and
charged under Texas law with firearm possession on school grounds. Id. The state charges
were dropped the following day, but Lopez was charged by federal officials for violating the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1) (1994), which prohibited the
presence of guns in the immediate area of schools. 514 U.S. at 551.
29. See id. at 581 (O'Connor, J. concurring) ("[W]e have a particular duty to ensure
that the federal-state balance is not destroyed.").
30. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
32. 529 U.S. at 617-19.
33. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
34. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
35. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 155-57, 161. New York v. United States
arose out of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 whereby
Congress, at the behest of the National Governors Association, developed a plan to establish
regional low-level radioactive waste sites. The Act (and its successor) "authorized States to
enter into regional compacts that, once ratified by Congress, would have the authority.., to
restrict the use of their disposal facilities to waste generated within member States." Id. at
150-52. The Court upheld those provisions of the Act, which provided incentives for state
compliance but struck the sections that compelled the states to act in particular ways. Id. at
188. Printz involved the validity of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, which
sought to establish a "national instant background check system," but provided as an in-
terim measure that state and local law enforcement officers would conduct the background
check until the national system was in place. 521 U.S. at 902. The Court held that this provi-
sion impressed state officials into federal service in violation of the Tenth Amendment. Id.
at 933-35.
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away from the legislature and toward the courts. All of these re-
strictions on congressional power seem impelled by identical
concerns-that states matter in our constitutional regime and that
courts must ensure that federal power is exercised in a way that
respects the constitutional role of states.3 6
A similar theme animates the Court's rejuvenation of sovereign
immunity. Thirty years ago state sovereign immunity to federal
claims was an arcane and esoteric subject, beloved by federal juris-
diction aficionados but without significant practical import. The
doctrine was academic in part because it was readily avoidable un-
der the doctrine of Ex parte Young,37 which held that sovereign
immunity did not apply to actions seeking to enjoin a state official
from violating federal law.3 Therefore, plaintiffs seeking prospec-
tive relief for federal claims did not have to worry much about
sovereign immunity.3 9 All they had to do was be careful to name a
state official rather than the state as the defendant. As a result, sov-
ereign immunity was little more than a technical, narrow limitation
upon the ability of federal courts to redress constitutional or civil
rights grievances. 4°
In addition, for many decades the Supreme Court signaled that
Congress could readily abrogate state sovereign immunity. For ex-
ample, in Parden v. Terminal Railway41 the Court found that the
State of Alabama could be sued under the Federal Employer's Li-
ability Act (FELA) 41 when it operated an interstate railroad. The
Court reasoned that "the States necessarily surrendered any por-
tion of their sovereignty [when they granted Congress the power
36. Thus in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), the Court rejected the ar-
gument that Congress may regulate non-economic, violent criminal conduct based solely
on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce. The Court stated that "[t]he
Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local." Id.
at 617-18.
37. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
38. The doctrine of Ex parte Young is premised on the view that a state cannot author-
ize an official to violate federal law. Id. at 159. Actions committed in violation of federal law
are, therefore, ultra vires and not the actions of the state. Id. As a result, they cannot be
shielded by the sovereign's immunity. For the Supreme Court's latest detailed discussion of
the doctrine, see Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997), a plurality opinion
holding that Ex parte Young does not override sovereign immunity defense in an action to
determine title to submerged lands.
39. Sovereign immunity did prevent plaintiffs from obtaining retrospective relief from
states unless the states waived their immunity or it was abrogated by Congress. See Edelman
v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
40. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237 (1974) (holding that under Ex parte
Youngstate officials cannot avoid liability under a properly pleaded complaint).
41. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
42. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994) (providing cause of action for injured railroad work-
[VOL. 35:1&2
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to regulate commerce].... Since imposition of the FELA right of
action upon interstate railroads is within the congressional regula-
tory power, it must follow that application of the Act to such a
railroad cannot be precluded by sovereign immunity. 0
3
A decade later, the Supreme Court announced that Congress'
enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment supported abrogation of sovereign immunity.4 4 Finding that
the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to limit the authority of
the states, the Court held that Congress can override any state
claim to sovereign immunity when it acts pursuant to Section 5.45
Importantly, in concluding that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
196446 abrogated sovereign immunity, the Court paid little atten-
tion to whether Title VII was actually authorized by Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, the mere fact that Title VII
was designed to redress discrimination in employment seemed suf-
ficient to convince the Court that Tide VII fell within the purview
of Section 5 7
Finally in 1989, in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., the Court ap-
48peared to announce the virtual death of state sovereign immunity.
In an opinion written by Justice Brennan, a plurality held that the
Commerce Clause generally empowers Congress to abrogate sov-
ereign immunity. Arguing that states surrendered their immunity
when they consented to Article I, the plurality49 held that the Con-
stitution itself viewed sovereign immunity as a common law
doctrine that could be overridden when Congress acted pursuant
to its Constitutional powers.50
43. Parden, 377 U.S. at 192.
44. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
45. Id.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
47. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 452. When Congress deliberated the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
there was a debate among scholars and senators whether Congress' authority was vested in
the Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Professor Gerald Gun-
ther argued that civil rights issues had little to do with economic concerns and were more
appropriately regulated by Congress' Section 5 power. The opposite position was taken by
Professor Herbert Wechsler and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, who argued that
discrimination had adverse economic consequences. The bill, as passed, placed primary
emphasis on the Commerce Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment rationale was an "af-
terthought." HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 90-93 (1990); GERALD
GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 201-03 (13th ed. 1997).
48. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
49. Id. at 13-23 (Brennan,J.,joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens).
50. Justice White agreed separately with the plurality's views of abrogation, creating a
majority on that issue. Id. at 45, 57 (White,J, concurring in part and dissenting in part). He
provided no hint, however, to his reasoning other than noting that he disagreed with Justice
Brennan's. Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
The Imperial Sovereign
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A few years later, however, the Court abruptly reversed direction,
transforming the doctrine of sovereign immunity from a technical
exception into a fundamental principle.5' In so doing, the Court
seemed driven by a view of federalism that sees the states not sim-
ply as alternative or separate spheres of political power,52 or
53laboratories of democracy, but rather as fully autonomous, even
almost regal, sovereign entities. As such, states, almost like other
independent nations, are considered broadly immune from fed-
eral directives.
5 4
In retrospect, we can see the first inklings of this sea change in
1984 when the Supreme Court decided Pennhurst State School &?
Hospital v. Halderman.5 In a case that after Garrett seems chillingly
prophetic for people with disabilities, the Pennhurst Court held
that federal courts could not provide relief under state law to resi-
dents of Pennsylvania's infamous institution for the mentally
56retarded. In reaching that decision, the Court went beyond the
text of the Eleventh Amendment and began the process of turning
a technicality into a fetish. Concern for the purported sovereignty
and sanctity of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, as if it were an
animate entity removed from its people and independent from
this nation, appeared to trump any regard for the people of Penn-
sylvania who were the victims of state institutional neglect.
For the ADA, however, the critical case was Seminole Tribe v.
Florida Seminole Tribe was truly a case that raised quite a narrow
Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy. Id. at 29 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). With the addition of Justice Thomas, in 1991, that group of dissenters became
a majority.
51. See Daan Braveman, Enforcement of Federal Rights Against States: Alden and Federalism
Non-Sense, 49 Am. U. L. REv. 611 (2000);Jonathan R. Siegel, Congress's Power to Authorize Suits
Against States, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 44 (1999); Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and
the Future of Federalism, 1999 Sue. CT. REV. 1.
52. SeeMcCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819).
53. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing).
54. SeeAlden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (Under the federal system established
by the Constitution, "[T]he States thus retain a residuary and inviolable sovereignty....
[and] the dignity... of sovereignty.") (internal citation omitted); Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) ("[E]ach State is a sovereign entity in our federal system.").
55. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
56. The school was the subject of substantial litigation, including three opinions by
the United States Supreme Court. See id.; Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1981) and
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981). For a discussion of the
Pennhurst litigation and the dilemmas it reveals for the disability rights movement, see MAR-
THA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN LAW
140-45 (1990).
57. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). SeeJames Leonard, A Damaged Remedy: Disability Discrimination
Claims Against State Entities Under the Americans With Disabilities Act After Seminole Tribe and
Flores, 41 ARIZ. L. REv. 651 (1999).
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question-namely, whether the Indian Commerce Clause gave
Congress the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity 5 In de-
ciding that it did not, Justice Rehnquist wrote broadly, reaching
beyond the Indian Commerce Clause and overruling Pennsylvania
v. Union Gas Co.59 Once again the Court reified the sovereignty of
the states. In so doing, however, the Court ignored its own often-
expressed concerns for a "strict" reading of the Constitution's
words. 6° Indeed, the Court acknowledged that its ruling went be-
yond the text of the Eleventh Amendment but justified this
expansion of sovereign immunity to prevent "'the indignity of sub-
jecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the
instance of private parties.' ,61 Once again the dignity of an inani-
mate entity had become more constitutionally crucial than the
rights of living citizens.
Even more ominously, the Court refused to apply the doctrine
of Ex parte Young to permit the plaintiffs to obtain prospective relief
against the Governor.62 As the Court saw it, the doctrine of Ex parte
Young was a fiction to be applied sparingly.63 Somewhat illogically,
the Court held that since Congress had attempted to abrogate sov-
ereign immunity, it must not have meant or presumed that
sovereign immunity could be circumvented by the ready availabil-
ity of Ex parte Young.64 The majority reasoned that Ex parte Young
58. The Indian Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to "regulate Commerce
... with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
59. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66-73.
60. See id. at 69 ("[W]e long have recognized that blind reliance upon the text of the
Eleventh Amendment is 'to strain the Constitution and the law to a construction never
imagined or dreamed of.'" (citations omitted)).
61. Id. at 58 (quoting Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewver Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.,
506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)). The Court's departure from the text of the Eleventh Amend-
ment was even more startling in Alden, which held that Congress could not create a cause of
action against the states enforceable in state courts. Because the Eleventh Amendment ex-
plicitly pertains to the judicial power of the United States, there was no question that the
Eleventh Amendment applied to the case on its own terms. Nevertheless, seeing the Elev-
enth Amendment as a mere reflection of a broader constitutional mandate for protecting
state sovereignty, the majority found that Article I did not give Congress the authority to
hold states accountable, even in their own courts, to federal laws. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 712 (1999).
62. Seminole 7ibe, 517 U.S. at 47 (citing ExparteYoung, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
63. Id. at 74 ("[W]here Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for the
enforcement against a State of a statutorily created right, a court should hesitate before
casting aside those limitations and permitting an action against a state officer based upon Ex
parte Young.").
64. Id. at 76 ("Nevertheless, the fact that Congress chose to impose upon the State a
liability that is significantly more limited than would be the liability imposed upon the state
officer under Ex parte Young strongly indicates that Congress had no wish to create the latter
under § 2710(d) (3).").
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should not be read as compatible with the statutory scheme, even
though that scheme had just been declared unconstitutional, and
even though Congress had undeniably sought to permit plaintiffs
to enforce their rights. Thus the sovereign's dignity was now seen
as so sacrosanct that a doctrine, which had made possible such
critical civil rights cases as Reynolds v. SimmS65 and Roe v. Wade,66
would be treated as a fiction that could and would be readily dis-
carded even when Congress plainly wanted the plaintiffs to be able
to enforce their rights.
On its face, however, Seminole Tribe did not imperil federal civil
rights laws, because the Court reaffirmed that Congress could in-
deed abrogate sovereign immunity when it acted pursuant to
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.67 As a result, a major im-
pact of Seminole Tribe was to lend great effect to the pinpointing of
a particular constitutional source of authority for each piece of leg-
islation. 8 Although such niceties are of little consequence when
there is agreement about the wide-ranging nature of federal
power,69 judicial antipathy to such power necessitates a more
searching and technical focus. And at the center of this new focus
was Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, hitherto a relatively
obscure and imprecise source of lawmaking authority.
7 °
City of Boerne v. Fore' ensured that Section 5 would no longer
remain obscure. The issue in Boerne was whether Congress had the
power under Section 5 to enact the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act. Holding that it did not, the Court chastised Congress for at-
tempting to usurp the judicial authority to determine the meaning
of the constitution and demanded that there be congruence and
proportionality between legislation enacted under Section 5 and
65. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
66. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
67. 517 U.S. at 59; see S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Symposium: Whose Federalism?, 32
IND. L. REv. 45, 52 (1998); Laurie A. McCann, The ADEA and the Eleventh Amendment, 2 EM-
PLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POLICY J. 241, 242 (1998); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, What is Eleventh
Amendment Immunity, 106 YALE L.J. 1683, 1688 (1996); Theresa R. Wilson, Nations Within a
Nation: The Evolution of Tribal Immunity, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 99, 122-23 (1999-2000).
68. See infra text accompanying notes 81-90; n.103.
69. See, e.g., Susan M. Bauerle, Congress' Commerce Clause Authority: Is the Pendulum Fi-
nally Swinging Back?, 1997 DET. C.L. Rav. 49, 115-17; Lino A. Graglia, United States v.
Lopez: Judicial Review Under the Commerce Clause, 74 TEX. L. REV. 719, 727-34 (1996); Deb-
orah Jones Merritt, TheFuzzy Logic of Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 685, 686 (1999).
70. Brown and Enrich, supra note 13, at 19-23 (reviewing pre-Boerne analysis of Sec-
tion 5); Id. at 34.
71. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994). Congress' disagreement with the Court's decision in
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), was the impetus behind the legislation. See
Sara Anderson Frey, Religion Behind Bars, 101 DICK. L. REv. 753, 762-66 (1997).
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rights protected by Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.7 3 The
notion that the Court is the ultimate arbiter of constitutional text
• • 74
is, in itself, an unremarkable proposition. But the Boerne Court
went beyond reaffirming judicial review to impose a significant
limitation on federal lawmaking power. Under Boerne it appears
that all Congress may do is proscribe remedies for judicially prede-
termined violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.75 The clear
import of that constraint is that Congress' affirmative authority
under Section 5 cannot readily provide an alternative source of
legislative power to enact regulatory aims that are not sufficiently
commercial to satisfy Lopez.76
To be sure, Boerne's language was ambiguous. The Supreme
Court reaffirmed earlier cases that demanded deference to con-
gressional actions under Section 5.77 It is, therefore, possible to
read Boerne as a simple statement that there are some limits to
congressional action under Section 5. Indeed, lower courts initially
read Boerne as a fairly narrow and unexceptional ruling.
But once it was unleashed, Boerne was bound to collide with
Seminole Tribe, and, once they fused, to unleash a chain reaction. 9
Because Seminole Tribe held that Congress could not abrogate sov-
ereign immunity except when it was acting under Section 5, and
because Boerne circumscribed congressional authority under Sec-
tion 5, all federal civil rights laws that provided for remedies
against the states inevitably became constitutionally suspect under
the combined weight of Seminole Tribe and Boerne. And that was
precisely what happened in Kimel v. Florida.s°
73. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530.
74. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
75. Brown and Enrich, supra note 13, at 21-23, 34-40 (discussing how Boerne limits
Congress' power under Section 5).
76. Id. at 34.
77. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530 (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308
(1966)).
78. There are several possible broader readings of Boerne. If, for example, Congress
may only remedy judicially determined violations, Congress may no longer act prophylacti-
cally. Moreover, it remains unclear whether Boerne sets rules for Section 5 authority
generally or simply curbs that authority vis-A-vis states. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel,
Equal Protection By Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110
YALE L.J. 441, 511 n.299 (2000) (citing Kazmier v. Widman, 225 E3d 519, 523-24, 529-30
(5th Cir. 2000)).
79, The Court said as much in Garrett, suggesting that even if Congress had estab-
lished that states had engaged in a "pattern of unconstitutional discrimination," the ADA
would still fail because "the rights and remedies" it created would "raise the same sort of
concerns as to congruence and proportionality as were found in City of Boerne." 531 U.S.
356, 372 (2001).
80. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
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Kimel held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) "' could not be enforced against the states. The same five
to four majority that had initiated the sovereign immunity revolu-
tion in Seminole Tribe held that since the Court had not previously
declared that age was a suspect classification the ADEA, in effect,
prohibited more state conduct "than would likely be held uncon-
stitutional.", 2 Kimel thus made the majority's mission abundantly
clear: to limit federal power whenever it comes close to infringing
on the sovereign rights of states to decide whether their citizens
have the right to be free from age-based discrimination. 3
In United States v. Morrison4 the Court again determined that
Congress had exceeded its authority under both the Commerce
Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in enacting
the Violence Against Women Act.8' According to the Court, Con-
gress could not create a federal judicial forum for claims
pertaining to gender-motivated violence even if states had pro-
vided inadequate remedies of their own. 6 Private acts of violence
are simply outside the purview of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and thus beyond Congress' reach under Section 5. s7
In effect, the Court reasoned that so-called private acts of gender-
based violence are matters to be left solely to the discretion of the
sovereign states.88 Ironically, the Court seemed to turn a blind eye
to Kimels admonition against federal laws permitting direct suits
against states. In any event, once again the Court sacrificed federal
lawmaking authority on the altar of federalism.
The combustible quartet of Lopez, Boerne, Kimel, and Morrison
proved cataclysmic for the ADA. Although in enacting the ADA
Congress explicitly stated that it was acting under both its com-
merce powers and Section 5,s9 in the year following Kimel andMorrison, five courts of appeals held that Congress could not use
81. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-33 (1994).
82. 528 U.S. at 86.
83. In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527
U.S. 666 (1999), the Court similarly found that Congress lacked the authority under Section
5 to abrogate sovereign immunity under the Patent and Plant Variety Remedy Clarification
Act. Likewise, the Court held in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), that Congress did not have authority under Section 5 to
abrogate sovereign immunity for actions brought against states under the Lanham Act. The
Court found that acts disparaging a trademark did not involve Fourteenth Amendment
property rightsjustifying congressional actions under Section 5.
84. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
86. 529 U.S. at 623-24.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 619-24.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (b)(4) (1994).
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Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state sover-
eign immunity for various ADA claims. 90 Given that trend, the
result in Garrett was not surprising.
Still, significant distinctions between the statutes previously
found unconstitutional and the ADA should have given the Court
pause.' Most notable was the extensive record of state discrimina-
tion against people with disabilities, documented by Justice Breyer
in a lengthy appendix to his dissent.92 If the problem in cases such
as Lopez, Boerne and Kimel was the lack of legislative findings, no
such impediment should have been relied upon in Garrett.
But this distinction proved insufficient to save Title I of the
ADA. Following Boerne,93 Chief Justice Rehnquist began by noting
that congressional power under Section 5 is only remedial: "[I] t is
the responsibility of this Court, not Congress, to define the sub-
stance of constitutional guarantees." 94 Relying upon its decision in
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,5 the majority then held that Sec-
tion 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit "rational"
discrimination against people with disabilities. Congress' actions,
90. See Lavia v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections, 224 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2000); Neinast
v. Texas, 217 E3d 275 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1190 (2001); Popovich v. Cuyhoga
County Ct. Com. Pi., 227 F.3d 627 (6th Cir. 2000); Erickson v. Bd. of Governors, 207 F.3d
945 (7th Cir. 2000); Fisher v. Iowa Comm'n of Veterans Affairs, 230 E3d 1362 (8th Cir.
2000). But see Becker v. Armenakis, 229 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2000) (unpublished); Cisneros v.
Wilson, 226 E3d 1113 (10th Cir. 2000). Illustrative is Judge Easterbrook's decision for the
Seventh Circuit in Erickson. In the case, which was brought by a state employee, the court
held that because the ADA prohibited certain forms of "rational" discrimination against
individuals with disabilities, Erickson, 207 F.3d at 948, it condemns activities that do not
themselves violate the Equal Protection Clause, id. at 948-49 (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)). Under Boerne, Judge Easterbrook reasoned, Congress
lacks such authority under Section 5 unless the prohibition can be sustained as "reasonable
prophylactic legislation." Id. at 951. Because Congress did not find that states engaged in
the type of irrational, intentional discrimination that the Court believes Section 1 pro-
scribes, the ADA is not as sufficiently connected as Kimel demands to the prevention of
constitutional wrongs, and is therefore outside the scope of Section 5. Id. at 951. As a result,
the Court found that the plaintiff could not enforce her employment discrimination claims
against the state.
91. For a pre-Garrett scholarly attempt to distinguish and save the ADA, see Ruth
Colker, The Section Five Quagmire, 47 UCLA L. REv. 653 (2000). Professor Colker relies not so
much on the extensive record of congressional findings to save the ADA but on the argu-
ment that the ADA, in contrast to other laws found to exceed Section 5, did not itself violate
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 698-01.
92. Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 581 U.S. 356, 389-424 (2001) (BreyerJ., dissenting).
93. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
94. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365.
95. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
96. 531 U.S. at 366-68. The Court stated that "the result of Cleburne is that states are
not required by the Fourteenth Amendment to make special accommodations for the dis-
abled, so long as their actions toward such individuals are rational. They could quite
hardheadedly-and perhaps hardheartedly-hold to job-qualification requirements which
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therefore, had to be "congruent and proportional" to the remedia-
tion of irrational discrimination.97
Justice Rehnquist easily concluded that Title I of the ADA did
not pass the Court's test and dismissed the legislative record that
the dissent pointed to as establishing that, in the case of the ADA,
Congress had done its homework and had substantiated a pattern
of discrimination justifying the exercise of Section 5 remedial
power. Justice Rehnquist stated: "[the record] consists not of legis-
lative findings, but of unexamined, anecdotal accounts of 'adverse,
disparate treatment by state officials.' ,98
Demanding that Congress demonstrate a persuasive pattern of
irrational discrimination by states," and finding that Tide I ex-
tended beyond the scope of the specific and particular violations
set forth in the legislative record,'00 the majority found that Section
5 could not support Title I.
To be sure, the majority's decision did not completely foreclose
all ADA claims against the states. First, the majority specifically lim-
ited its opinion to Title I, finding that Title II was not before the
Court.'O' Given the Court's reasoning, however, it is difficult to
imagine why Title II will not suffer a similar fate, °2 especially when
do not make allowance for the disabled." Id. at 367-68. For a critique of the Court's use of
Cleburne, see infra text accompanying notes 205-06.
97. 531 U.S. at 374.
98. Id. at 370 (citation omitted).
99. The Court stated that evidence of discrimination by cities should not count to
support congressional authority under Section 5. According to the Court, since Section 5
was being considered only because of sovereign immunity, and cities lack sovereign immu-
nity, municipal violations of the Equal Protection Clause no longer justified congressional
remediation under Section 5. Id. at 368-69. This reasoning is extremely surprising, as the
Court has long held, and did not deny, cities are "state actors" for purposes of Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989); Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913). Why the fact that
Congress' Section 5 authority happened to be questioned in a case concerning sovereign
immunity (a defense that is not available to cities) should serve to remove Congress' ability
to cite and rely upon violations of Section 1 by municipal state actors as a basis for congres-
sional action under Section 5 was left unexplained by the Court. In essence, the Court
suggests that sovereign immunity doctrines directly limit the scope of congressional action
under Section 5, even though the Court maintains that it is the Fourteenth Amendment
that overrides sovereign immunity. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363-65.
100. The Court's insistence on specificity echoes much of its discrimination jurispru-
dence. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (holding that those entitled to participate in affirmative
action plans must have been specifically discriminated against by the state actor); Ford Mo-
tor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (1982) (concluding that only specific victims of
discriminatory acts may participate in remedy).
101. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360 n.1.
102. Several courts have found that the reasoning in Garrett applies to Title II. See, e.g.,
Neiberger v. Hawkins, 150 E Supp. 2d 1118 (D. Colo. 2001); Mincewicz v. Parker, No.
3:00CV1433 (CFD), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3373 (D. Conn. Feb. 26, 2001); Lieberman v.
Delaware, Civ. No. 96-523GMS, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13624 (D. Del. Aug. 30, 2001); Koslow
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Title II is used to require the state to make reasonable accommo-
dations.0 3 Perhaps more interestingly, the majority in a footnote
left open the possibility that plaintiffs could use the doctrine of Ex
parte Young to obtain prospective relief against state officials. 4
Since Garrett, several courts have permitted plaintiffs to do so.'0
Prior to Garrett, however, several courts noted that the ADA creates
no cause of action against state officials. 06 Finally, the Court's deci-
sion did not touch upon the Rehabilitation Act, which also
abrogates sovereign immunity and is substantively quite similar to
the ADA.'0 7 Several lower courts, however, have read the Supreme
Court's sovereign immunity doctrine to go as far as to preclude
v. Pennsylvania, 158 F. Supp. 2d 539 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Frederick v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 157
F. Supp. 2d 509 (E.D. Pa. 2001). But see Shaboon v. Duncan, 252 F.3d 722 (5th Cir. 2001)
(providing no analysis); Wroncy v. Or. Dep't of Transp., No. 00-35356, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
8761 (9th Cir. May 4, 2001) (arguing that Garrett does not compel its application to Title II);
Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D. Me. 2001) (arguing that Garrett did not apply to Title II
and does not apply to claims for injunctive relief); Project Life, Inc. v. Glendening, 139 F.
Supp. 2d 703 (D. Md. 2001) (relying on pre-Garrett law to determine sovereign immunity
under Title II).
103. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. 35.130(b)(1)(7) (requiring public entities to make reasonable
modifications "when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of
disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would
fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity"). There are other prob-
lems that may affect Title II. For example, while it seems likely that Congress had authority
under the Commerce Clause to enact Title I (even if that authority did not permit abroga-
tion of sovereign immunity), Congress' authority to regulate under Title II state activities
that do not fall within Lopez' narrow view of commerce may be more questionable Cf New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1994) (suggesting that considerations of federalism
should be used to construe, and narrow, the Commerce Clause).
104. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9 ("[ADA] standards can be enforced .. by private indi-
viduals in actions for injunctive relief under Ex parte Young.... .").
105. E.g., Gibson v. Ark. Dep't of Corr., 265 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 2001) (arguing that
Garrett contains clear language permitting Ex parte Young actions); Frazier v. Simmon, 254
E3d 1247 (10th. Cir. 2001) (relying on Garrett footnote); Randolph v. Rodgers, 253 E3d 342
(8th Cir. 2001) (allowing prospective relief using Ex parte Young); Frederick v. Dep't of Pub.
Welfare, 157 F. Supp. 2d 509 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (reading Garrett as permitting Exparte Young
actions); State Police for Automatic Retirement Assoc. v. Difava, 138 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D.
Mass. 2001) (same); Rizzato-Reines v. Kane County Sheriff, 149 F. Supp. 2d 482 (N.D. Ill.
2001) (holding that injunctive relief may be available, but not for employment claims).
106. Walker v. Snyder, 213 F.3d 344 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Shariffv. Artuz, 99 Civ. 0321,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12248 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2000); Miller v. Hogeland, No. 00-516, 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9927 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 2000); Nucifora v. Bridgeport Bd. of Educ., 3:00-CV-
00079 (EBB), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9127 (D. Conn. May 23, 2000). But see Henrietta D. v.
Giuliani, 81 E Supp. 2d 425 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
107. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1994). The Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination against a
qualified individual with a disability by recipients of federal financial assistance. 29 U.S.C.
§ 794 (1994).
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bringing Rehabilitation Act claims against the state, even though
that statute is based upon Congress' spending power.108
• The question thus must be asked: What is this idea of sover-
eignty which so imperils the rights of people with disabilities?
II. THE MYTH OF SOVEREIGNTY
Underlying the Garrett decision is the assumption that sover-
eignty is a natural phenomenon. The reality, of course, is that the
sovereignty the Court envisions is as mythic as the "fiction" of Ex
parte Young which the Court continuously derides.'09 Indeed, in a
series of powerful dissents, Justice Souter has laid bare the major-
ity's ahistoric and false reading of the framers' understanding of
sovereign immunity."l In particular, Justice Souter has reminded us
that "[t]here is almost no evidence that the generation of the
Framers thought sovereign immunity was fundamental in the sense
of being unalterable.""' In a preface to his exhaustive and pains-
takingly careful review of the history of sovereign immunity in his
dissent in Alden v. Maine, Justice Souter noted:
Some Framers thought sovereign immunity was an obsolete
royal prerogative inapplicable in a republic; some thought
sovereign immunity was a common law power defeasible, like
other common law rights, by statute; and perhaps a few
thought, in keeping with a natural law view distinct from the
common law conception, that immunity was inherent in a
sovereign because the body that made a law could not logi-
108. SeeJim C. v. United States, 235 E3d 1079, 1080-81 (8th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (up-
holding congressional authority to condition federal money on waiver of sovereign
immunity but "only with regard to the individual agency that receives" the federal funds);
Id. at 1082 (Bowman,J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress cannot use the Spending Clause
to achieve regulatory aims outside the scope of its other regulatory authority); Bradley v.
Ark. Dep't of Educ., 189 E3d 745, 757 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding the Rehabilitation Act exces-
sively coercive to pass muster under the Spending Clause); Litman v. George Mason Univ.,
186 F.3d 544, 556-57 (4th Cir. 1999) (inviting Supreme Court to revisit and narrow its in-
terpretation of the Spending Clause); see alsoVa. Dep't of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F3d 559, 569-
70 (4th Cir. 1997) (questioning whether threat to withhold all federal funding for special
education for states' failure to comply with the IDEA constitutes impermissible coercion of
states).
109. E.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73-76 (1996).
110. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 760-814 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting); 517 U.S. at
100-85 (SouterJ., dissenting).
111. 527 U.S. at 764 (SouterJ., dissenting).
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cally be bound by it. Natural law thinking on the part of a
doubtful few will not, however, support the Court's position.
'12
LikeJustice Brennan before him,'13Justice Souter has also raised
grave questions about the majority's retelling of the enactment of
the Eleventh Amendment and Hans v. Louisiana's 14 interpretation
of it. In contrast to the majority's assertion that the Eleventh
Amendment was meant to reassert a fundamental principle of state
immunity, 5 Justice Souter has demonstrated that the amendment
"reaches only to suits subject to federal jurisdiction exclusively un-
der the Citizen-State Diversity Clauses," 6 and was meant to be far
less expansive than the majority presumes."'
But the majority's inflexible interpretation of sovereign immu-
nity, and the constraints it imposes on congressional authority, is
not misguided simply because it ignores the text of the Constitu-
tion,11 decades of Supreme Court precedent,119 and the history of
the Eleventh Amendment. 20 It is also wrong and dangerous be-
cause it relies upon a false and perilous vision of the nature of
sovereignty, its relationship to federalism and separation of powers,
and its impact on minority groups.
Throughout the world and across the ages, sovereignty has al-
ways been more of an ideal, a metaphor, or a political rallying cry
than an impermeable reality. The history of Western nations, for
example, demonstrates that political power has always been both
diffused and contingent. In Britain, the divisibility of sovereignty
was recognized as far back as the Magna Carta. 21 The Tudor Kings
112. Id. at 764; see also 517 U.S. at 100 (SouterJ., dissenting).
113. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1989); see also Welch v. Tex.
Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 504 (1987) (Brennan,J., dissenting).
114. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
115. See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 712-17; Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at53-54.
116. 517 U.S. at 110 (SouterJ., dissenting).
117. Id. at I I I n.8. Many scholars agree. See, e.g., Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Feder-
alism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1467-68 (1987) (giving examples where state sovereign immunity
does not deny jurisdiction); Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign
Immunity Doctrines: Congressional Imposition of Suit Upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. Rav. 1203
(1978); Herbert Hovenkamp, Judicial Restraint and Constitutional Federalism: The Supreme
Court's Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 2213, 2238-45 (1996); Vicki
C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE
L.J. 1, 4-6 (1988).
118. 517 U.S. at 114-16 nn.12-13.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 41-56.
120. Alden, 527 U.S. at 762-82 (SouterJ., dissenting).
121. See WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, I A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES, THE
BIRTH OF BRITAIN 252-54 (1966) (noting that "custom and the law must stand even above
the King").
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may have called themselves "sovereigns" 22 but when the Stuarts
took that label literally, one lost his head and another was de-
throned.1 23 Indeed, by the time of the American Revolution, the
idea that the British "sovereign" was sovereign was plainly false, as
political power increasingly resided in Parliament.1
24
Scholars who studied the idea of sovereignty recognized its eva-
nescence. Neither an actual nor a necessary component of
governments, sovereignty is merely a label, with a variety of conno-
tations and political permutations.25 As E.H. Carr has noted,
"[sovereignty] was never more than a convenient label; and when
distinctions began to be made between political, legal and eco-
nomic sovereignty or between internal and external sovereignty, it
was clear that the label had ceased to perform its proper function
... ,,"126 As a label, sovereignty serves a variety of purposes. Accord-
ing to Professor Hunnum, the idea of sovereignty serves to
legitimize the exercise of political power, enable a state to defend
itself from encroachment by other states, and identify the locus of
political power within a state.127 What sovereignty does not do is
define a singular, concrete, essential characteristic of political
life-not to mention an animate entity whose dignitary interests
must be respected. 28
Today, more than ever, the contingency and hazards of sover-
eignty are apparent. Increasingly, the world has recognized that
the idea of monolithic sovereignty stands in the way of both peace
122. Queen Elizabeth I is said to have acknowledged to her Parliament that she knew
"what it is to be a subject, what to be a Sovereign. . ." SIRJOHN E. NEALE, ELIZABETH I AND
HER PARLIAMENTS 1584-1601 118 (1957).
123. For an exhaustive analysis, see CHRISTOPHER HILL, THE CENTURY OF REVOLUTION
1603-1714 (1961).
124. See generally CHRISTOPHER HIBBERT, GEORGE III (1998); C. MCILWAIN, THE HIGH
COURT OF PARLIAMENT AND ITS SUPREMACY (1916); Lionel Marks Lavenue, Patent Infringe-
ment Against the United States and Government Contractors Under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 in the United
States Court of Federal Claims, 2J. INTELL. PROP. L. 389, 399 n.30 (1995) (noting that in early
common law the king would waive his immunity pursuant to a "Petition of Right," but as far
back as 1305 the King designed the concept of the "King in Parliament" to address these
petitions) (citations omitted).
125. SeeJENs BARTELSON, A GENEALOGY OF SOVEREIGNTY 239 (1995).
126. Id. at 13.
127. Hurst Hunnum, Sovereignty and Its Relevance to Native Americans in the Twenty-first
Century, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 487, 487-88 (1998).
128. In recent years the Justices have repeatedly referred to the "dignity" of the states.
See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 268 (1997) (Kennedy, J.) (plurality)
("[Tihe dignity and respect afforded a State, which the immunity is designed to protect, are
placed in jeopardy whether or not the suit is based on diversity jurisdiction. As a conse-
quence, suits invoking the federal-question jurisdiction of Article III courts may also be
barred by the Amendment.").
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and prosperity.2 As a result, European states renounce their sov-
ereign right to issue currency; 30 sovereignty is violated as heads of
state are indicted by extraterritorial war crimes tribunals,' and
NATO limits Serbia's sovereignty over Kosovo.132 In sharp contrast
is the Middle East, where both sides to the conflict have demanded
sovereignty over Jerusalem, leaving them no recourse but the
sword.
3
This is not to say that the myth of state sovereignty will lead here
to conflagration even though it did in 1861. 34 Rather, it is to
suggest that when sovereignty is regarded too literally, and
followed too rigidly, it undermines the ability of groups to resolve
their disputes in political, as opposed to violent ways. Viewed as an
absolute, as the Court sees it, sovereignty assumes the
authoritarian role played by Hobbes' Leviathan.3 5 To Hobbes,
sovereignty as a concept was ineluctably absolute. Ultimate power
had to reside somewhere, and that somewhere was the sovereign.1
6
Dispersion of that power undermined security and order,
129. Louis W. Goodman, Democracy, Sovereignty and Intervention, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L. L. &
POL'Y 27, 28-30 (1993) (the United States and other nations have ignored the concept of
absolute sovereignty in order to further the collective welfare).
130. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, March 25, 1957, art 4 (ex art.
3a), 1997 O.J. (C 340) 173-308, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/
index.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2002).
131. See Clifford Krauss, Judge Reinstates Pinochet Case with New Order for House Arrest, N.Y.
TIMES,Jan. 29, 2001, at A3.
132. Carlotta Gall, NATO and U.N. in Kosovo Agree on K.L.A. Role in Civilian Force, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 3, 1999, at Al (relaying that NATO and the U.N. agree to allow Kosovo Libera-
tion Army to function as a lightly armed force despite its violation of Serbian sovereignty).
133. Marshall Berger, The Future of Jerusalem: A Symposium: Introduction, 45 CATH. U. L.
REV. 653, 660 (1996) ("It will take such creative expressions of the concept of sovereignty to
proffer solace to those who seek the 'peace ofJerusalem.' "); ContestingJerusalem's Holy Sites,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2000, at A16 (noting after peace talks for the Middle East broke down
over questions of sovereignty, violence erupted and that "[finding a creative formula for
international sovereignty over the Temple Mount is the key to a final settlement"). To be
sure, these examples seem rather dated after the earth-shattering events of September 11,
2001. It appears clear that the responses to those events may well change the meaning of
traditional notions of political sovereignty, which the examples in the text were designed to
illustrate. Professor Huntington presciently posited a few years ago that in a post-Cold War
world, conflicts will no longer reflect purely the political goals of nation states but instead
will be reconfigured along cultural lines. SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZA-
TIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1996).
134. Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and
Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 863, 872 (1986) (remarking that the fundamental constitu-
tional question of the Civil War was which government possessed sovereignty).
135. THOMAs HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Michael Oakeshott ed., Oxford 1947) (1651).
136. Id. chs. XVII-XVIII at 109-20.
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precluding the possibility of peace or justice. 1 7 To the Hobbesian,
the only alternative to sovereignty is the state of nature, where life
is nasty, brutish and short.138 Absolute power, at least as an ideal,
therefore, was required to assure political and civil stability. That
vision of uncompromising total control, derived from the chaos of
the English Civil Wars, leaves no recourse for the recognition of
minority claims or the democratic evolution of norms.
III. SOVEREIGNTY AND OUR FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
Our Framers, of course, rejected the myth of absolute sover-
eignty. They understood the dangers of an indivisible and total
sovereignty, which emanated from the top down, and the need to
"split [that] atom." 3 9 Rather than create a single, hegemonic gov-
ernment, they crafted a complex union, with multiple-indeed
infinite-centers of power, which we refer to in shorthand when
we speak of federalism and separation of powers.
The history of the framing period and the debates about sover-
eignty which took place at that time is rich and complex, and an
exhaustive study of it is beyond the purview of this Article. It is,
however, important to emphasize the primary themes. Although
the idea of sovereignty "was the single most important abstraction
of politics in the entire Revolutionary era,"14° the critical concept of
divided sovereignty, which underlies our Constitutional structure,
was entirely original and "contrary to the prevailing maxims of po-
litical science."4 ' Equally radical was the Federalist idea that
ultimate sovereignty resided neither in the executive nor in the
legislature but rather in the people. 42 The theory was that sover-
137. Id. ch. XIII at 82, ch. XVIII at 120. The Eighteenth Century view was that sover-
eignty within any political system was indivisible and emanated from the top down.
MICHAEL KAMMEN, SOVEREIGNTY AND LIBERTY 17 (1988).
138. HOBBES, supra note 135, ch. XIII at 82. The notion was that "[a] state with more
than one independent sovereign power within its boundaries was a violation of the unity of
nature; it would be like a monster with more than one head, continually at war with itself,
an absurd chaotic condition that could result only in the dissolution of the state." GORDON
S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 345-46 (1969).
139. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 504 n.17 (1999) (quoting U.S. Term Limits v. Thorn-
ton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
140. WOOD, supra note 138, at 345.
141. Id. at 350.
142. Amar, supra note 117, at 1425-26. According to Professor Wood: "[I]f sovereignty
had to reside somewhere in the state-and the best political science of the eighteenth cen-
tury said it did-then many Americans concluded that it must reside only in the people-at-
large." Wood, supra note 138, at 382. This is the notion that Chief Justice Marshall so fa-
mously emphasized in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,403-05 (1819).
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eignty was vested in the people and that the people would limit the
authority of the national government by delegating certain powers
to (and reserving them for) the states. 4 3 Government power was to
be shared vertically (between the states and the federal govern-
ment) and horizontally (between the legislature and the
executive).
Under our Constitution, the federal government may be
supreme under the Supremacy Clause, but it is not an indivisible
sovereign, for states have their own jurisdiction, as well as the
ability to influence and affect federal decisions.'4Moreover, while
the Supreme Court may proclaim its own unilateral sovereignty
over constitutional questions,15 the Framers were careful to ensure
that both the composition and jurisdiction of the Court would
remain under the influence of the elected branches.16 As Chief
Justice Marshall understood so well in McCulloch v. Maryland, the
Court's power of judicial review does not forbid deference to
congressional determinations of the means necessary to achieve
constitutional goals.17  Thus under our constitutional regime
neither the Supreme Court, nor Congress, nor the federal
government, nor the states can be said to be truly sovereign in the
sense used by today's Court.14 According to Madison, the new
143. Justice Kennedy expressed a very different view in Garrett, stating: "States can, and do,
stand apart from the citizenry." 531 U.S. at 375 (Kennedy, J., concurring). To justice Kennedy,
the state is a sovereign entity, an almost corporeal being, apart from its people. See id.
144. SeeGarcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,550-51 (1985):
When we look for the States' residuary and inviolable sovereignty in the shape of the
constitutional scheme rather than in predetermined notions of sovereign power, a differ-
ent measure of state sovereignty emerges. Apart from the limitation on federal authority
inherent in the delegated nature of Congress' Article I powers, the principal means chosen
by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal system lies in the structure of
the Federal Government itself .... The States were vested with indirect influence over the
House of Representatives and the Presidency by their control of electoral qualifications and
their role in Presidential elections. They were given more direct influence in the Senate,
where each State received equal representation and each Senator was to be selected by the
legislature of his State. The significance attached to the States' equal representation in the
Senate is underscored by the prohibition of any constitutional amendment divesting a
State of equal representation without the State's consent.
(citations and internal quotations omitted).
145. "[I]t is this Court's precedent ... which must control." City of Boeme v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507,536 (1997).
146. See U.S. CONST., art. III.
147. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 424.
148.
'Our Federalism' ... does not mean blind deference to 'States' Rights' any more
than it means centralization of control over every important issue in our National
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
system was "made up 'of many coequal sovereignties.' 49 As Justice
Souter summarized in Seminole Tribe- "the adoption of the
Constitution made ... [the states] members of a novel federal
system that sought to balance the States' exercise of some
sovereign prerogatives delegated from their own people with the
principle of a limited but centralizing federal supremacy.,
5
0
Beyond distrust of the tyranny resulting from excessive concen-
trations of power, the motivation for sharing and dividing power
was to provide the people with multiple ways to protect their
rights. 5 1 In the words of Federalist 51:
In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people
is submitted to the administration of a single government;
and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of the
government into distinct and separate departments. In the
compound republic of America, the power surrendered by
the people is first divided between two distinct governments,
and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among dis-
tinct and separate departments. Hence a double security
arises to the rights of the people.
The theory was that no single group would gain enough power
to oppress minorities. The Framers understood Hume's warning
Government and its courts. The Framers rejected both these courses. What the con-
cept does represent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests
of both State and National Governments, and in which the National Government,
anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal inter-
ests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the
legitimate activities of the States. It should never be forgotten that this slogan, 'Our
Federalism,' born in the early struggling days of our Union of States, occupies a
highly important place in our Nation's history and its future.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971).
149. WOOD, supra note 138, at 529.
150. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 150 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).
151. Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea For New Contexts, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 1031, 1042 (1997).
152. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 291 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999). Pro-
fessor Amar also cites Federalist 28 as supporting this notion:
Power being almost always the rival of power, the general government will at all times
stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments, and these will have
the same disposition towards the general government. The people, by throwing
themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate. If their rights are in-
vaded by either, they can make use of the other as the instrument of redress.
Amar, supra note 117, at 1494 (emphasis in original) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at
180-81 (Alexander Hamilton)).
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that factions were inevitable. 5 3 Moreover, Madison was particularly
concerned that state legislators would not only ignore larger na-
tional issues but would also respond to the political passions of
their constituents. 4 To this end, he believed that a national gov-
ernment had to be able to overturn state "legislation inimical to
the essential rights of individuals and minorities.",
55
The relationship between the division of sovereignty and group
rights was most famously expounded by Madison in Federalist 10.
In that essay, Madison explained the threat to minority rights that
inheres when governance is concentrated in a singular, small state.
Speaking of a "pure democracy"''5 6 he stated: "A common passion
or interest will in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the
whole ... and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacri-
fice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual."' 57
The same could be said of inviolate sovereigns.
IV. SOVEREIGNTY AND MINORITY CLAIMS
Victims of discrimination, be it invidious or paternalistic, have
less reason than others to expect a single sovereign to be respon-
sive to their claims. To overcome the prejudice they face in one
arena, they need multiple fora in which to plead their claims. At
least until recently, the history of discrimination law validates the
Framers' insight as to the danger of undivided government.
153. Several constitutional historians have noted that Madison's inspiration for Federal-
ist Nos. 10 and 51 was David Hume's idea that factions were evil but inevitable and that
larger republics were better able to maintain social order than smaller ones. See, e.g.,
STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC McKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 86-87 (Oxford University
Press 1993); Richard A. Beeman, Self-Evident Fictions: Divine Right, Popular Sovereignty, And
The Myth Of The Constituent Power In The Anglo-American World, 67 TEx. L. REv. 1569, 1577-78
(1989) (reviewing EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (W.W. Norton & Co., 1988)).
154. Rakove, supra note 151, at 1044-45; see also, Jack Rakove, Editorial, A Nation Still
Learning What Madison Knew, N.Y. TIMES, March 11, 2001, § 4, at 15.
155. Rakove, supra note 151, at 1045. Professor Rakove suggests thatjudicial review and
the Supremacy Clause were the devices for maintaining the superiority of national laws. Id.
at 1047.
156. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 152, at 49 (James Madison). While Madison
does not speak of monolithic sovereigns, he conceptualizes pure democracies as such, for in
them, all power is vested in the majority. He contrasts these democracies with a federated
republic where power is disbursed. Id.
157. Id. Of course the minority parties that Madison was especially concerned with were
the propertied classes. Id. at 45.
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The struggle to protect the rights of African Americans most
clearly illustrates the critical importance of having multiple ave-
nues for the recognition and vindication of rights. 15 Indeed, in
large part the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to au-
thorize Congress to enact legislation to protect the rights of
African Americans from state infringement.
1 5 9
In the twentieth century, belated federal action was required to
break the grip of state Jim Crow laws. Thus, before the federal
government enacted a crucial series of civil rights laws in mid-
century, in many states African Americans were disenfranchised
and otherwise deprived of their most basic civil liberties.IH Bereft
of the ballot and systematically excluded from economic opportu-
nity, African Americans had little ability to influence state
legislatures. Only by appealing to a broader polity could their
voices be heard and their rights Slowly vindicated.1 6 1 Other disem-
powered groups have similarly had to rely upon federal authority
to overcome resistance at the state level of their rights, further il-
lustrating the necessity for multiple fora. For example, it took
federal legislation to dismantle state laws that restricted women's
economic opportunities. 62
This is not to say that the federal government has always been
more solicitous of the powerless. Notably, many states and cities
have enacted prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of
163sexual orientation, despite the repeated failure of Congress to do
158. Indeed the abolition of slavery by the Thirteenth Amendment required the asser-
tion of federal supremacy.
159. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION 239-61 (1988). In fact, in vetoing the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, which had been enacted pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment, President
Johnson asked: "[w] here can we find a Federal prohibition against the power of any state to
discriminate[?]" GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 47, at 919.
160. C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 6-10 (3d rev. ed. 1974).
See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976) (describing the history of the civil
rights struggle leading up to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
161. The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is illustrative:
[Niational legislation is required to meet a national need which becomes ever more
obvious. That need is evidenced, on the one hand, by a growing impatience by vic-
tims of discrimination with its continuance and, on the other hand, by a growing
recognition on the part of all of our people of the incompatibility of such discrimina-
tion with our ideals and the principles to which this country is dedicated.
H.R. REP. No 914 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2393.
162. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, § 708, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1994) (provid-
ing that Title VII preempts contradictory state laws).
163. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.7 (West Supp. 2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46a-
81a-46a-81r (West Supp. 1995); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2501, 2502, 2512 (1998); RAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 378-2 (Michie Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4 (1990); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (West Supp. 2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 2001); VT. STAT.
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so.'6 Moreover, the existence of multiple fora may also at times
benefit the powerful. For example, the federal courts have limited
the ability of previously disempowered groups to institute affirma-
tive action policies. 165 The point here is not that particular groups
are more apt to prevail in a particular forum, but rather that those
who are disempowered especially need the opportunity to take
their claims to other venues, and to utilize multiple opportunities
to have their voices heard. If the first forum is the final forum
those who have traditionally been excluded from or neglected by
that forum have little chance for a peaceful resolution of their
claims.
Initially, the Rehnquist Court's resurrection of state sovereignty
was animated by these very concerns. In an early "new federal-
ism " 66 case, Gregory v. Ashcroft,167 Justice O'Connor wrote for the
plurality:
This federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the
people numerous advantages. It assures a decentralized
government that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of
a heterogeneous society; it increases opportunity for citizen
involvement in democratic processes; it allows for more
ANN. tit. 3, § 963 (1995); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 16.765 (West 1996); see also BERKLEY, CAL.,
MUN. CODE ch. 13.28 (2002), City of Berkeley, available at http://www.ci.Berkeley.ca.us/
bmc; DENVER, COLO., MUN. CODE § 28-91 (2002); ATLANTA, GA., CITY CHARTER, 1996 GA.
LAWS 4469 (2002), Mun. Code Corp., available at http://wwww.municode.com; CHICAGO,
ILL., MUN. CODE. chs. 2-120, 2-160, & 5-8 (2002); BALTIMORE, MD., CITY CODE art. 4 (2000);
BOSTON, MASS., MUN. CODE §§ 12-9.1-12-915 (2001), Am. Legal Publishing Corp., available
at http://www.amlegal.com/bostonma/; MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE chs. 139 & 141
(2002); AUSTIN, TEX., CODE § 7-1-1 (2001), Am.Legal Publishing Corp., available at
http://www.amlegal.com/austintx/; SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE chs. 14.04 & 14.08
(2002), City of Seattle, available at http://clerk.ci.seattle.wa.us/-public/codel.htm; ML-
WAUKEE, WIS., CODE §§ 109-5 & 109-9 (2002).
164. See Employment Non-Discrimination Act, S. 2056, 104th Cong. (1996) (would
have prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in employment) (reintro-
duced as H.R. 1858, 105th Cong. (1997) and S. 869, 105th Cong. (1997), and reintroduced
again as H.R. 2355, 106th Cong. (1999) and S. 1276, 106th Cong. (1999)) [hereinafter
ENDA]; 142 CONG. REC. S10129, S10139 (1996) (explaining that ENDA fell one vote short
of passage); see also Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 249 (1996)
(codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C. § 1738c (1994)) (passed by 104th Congress
at same time it declined to pass ENDA) (exempting states from any obligation to recognize
same-sex unions recognized by the laws of other states, and defining the terms "marriage"
and "spouse" under federal law as referring to only opposite-sex relationships).
165. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
166. By "new federalism," we refer to the doctrines developed by the Rehnquist Court,
which limit the authority of the federal government and assert the sovereignty of the states.
See supra text accompanying notes 27-92.
167. 501 U.S. 451 (1990).
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innovation and experimentation in government; and it makes
government more responsive by putting the States in
competition for a mobile citizenry.
168
The belief that dual sovereignty is critical to the preservation of
the rights of vulnerable people has been a central theme in the
Court's recent cases. In New York v. United States, 69 for example, a
majority joined Justice O'Connor in holding that Congress lacked
authority to require States to enact legislation implementing fed-
eral environmental mandates, noting that:
[T]he Constitution divides authority between federal and
state governments for the protection of individuals. State sov-
ereignty is notjust an end in itself: "Rather, federalism secures
to citizens the liberties that derives from the diffusion of sov-
ereign power.',
70
Numerous subsequent cases, deciding different doctrinal points,
• • 171
echo this principle.
For individuals with disabilities, the opportunity to bypass the
discrimination in one arena by rearguing their claims in another
has proven particularly important. At the time of the Pennhurst
case, for example, state laws appeared to respect the rights of insti-
tutionalized persons.' 7' But advocates for people with disabilities
168. Id. at 458 (citations omitted).
169. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
170. Id. at 181 (citation omitted).
171. E.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (explaining why the Tenth
Amendment limits Congress from commandeering state executive officials); Lopez v.
United States, 514 U.S. 549, 568-83 (1995) (Kennedy & O'Connor, JJ., concurring) (ex-
plaining limitations of congressional power under the Commerce Clause).
172. The district court had considered the plaintiff's state law claim under the Mental
Health and Mental Retardation Act and found the defendant liable. Halderman v. Penn-
hurst State Sch. & Hosp., 446 E Supp. 1295, 1323 (E.D. Pa. 1977). The applicable provision
of the act stated, "[t]he department [of public welfare] shall have power, and its duty shall
be: (1) To assure within the State the availability and equitable provision of adequate men-
tal health and mental retardation services for all persons who need them....." Id. at 1322
(quoting 50 P.S. § 4201). A state court had previously held that the act gave the subject of a
commitment proceeding "a right to treatment" and gave the court the power to order the
course of her treatment. Id. (quoting In rejoyce Z., No. 2035-69 (C.P, Allegheny County,
filed March 31, 1975)). As a result, the district court held:
It is abundantly clear that the Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act... grants
to the retarded in Pennsylvania the statutory right to minimally adequate habilita-
tion. Furthermore, it is equally clear that the Commonwealth and the counties have
been charged under the Act with the responsibility of providing such minimally ade-
quate habilitation to the retarded. The Act envisions a comprehensive cooperative
State-county (or multi-county) program for the care, treatment and rehabilitation of
FALL 2001-WINTER 2002]
understood that it would take the leverage of a different forum to
convince the state legislator to disgorge the money necessary to
recognize the state's own professed goals.Y
3
Resort to a federal forum was also required to ensure that chil-
dren with disabilities receive an adequate education. Indeed, the
history of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act'14 shows
how the existence of multiple fora can serve, in Brandeis' term, as
"laboratories of democracy," 75 paving the way for increasing pro-
tection of the disempowered. Thus, the experiments of a few
states 76 in educating children with disabilities refracted to the na-
tional level, leading to federal legislation mandating such rights
even in those states that had failed to provide them. Without fed-
eral lawsuits, federal legislation and the federal money that came
with it, however, it is doubtful that all states would have routinely
educated the severely disabled children.
Likewise, as Justice Breyer demonstrates so thoroughly in
Garrett, the ADA was, in large part, a response to the failure of
many states to protect the rights of people with disabilities.
7
Indeed, many of the key provisions of the Title II regulations,
7 8
which apply generally to the programs and laws of states and local
governments, relate to areas in which states were especially
persons who are ... mentally retarded.... The State, through the Department of
Welfare, is responsible for the overall supervision and control of the program to as-
sure the availability of and equitable provision for adequate ... mental retardation
facilities, and the counties, separately or in concert, are assigned responsibilities as to
particular programs. On the basis of this record, we find that both the Common-
wealth and the counties have violated their statutory obligation to provide minimally
adequate habilitation to the retarded residents at Pennhurst.
Id. at 1322-23 (citations omitted).
173. For a discussion of the case, see MINOW, supra note 56, at 140 n.144.
174. Federal protections for children with disabilities are provided by the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1485 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). For a dis-
cussion of how the Act's predecessor was a result of federal litigation, see Board of Education
v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192 (1982) ("Both the House and Senate Reports attribute the im-
petus for the Act and its predecessors to two federal-court judgments ... ."). The future of
the IDEA is now uncertain in light of Garrett's construction of Congress' power under Sec-
tion 5 to protect people with disabilities and lower courts' questioning of Congress' power
to use the Spending Clause to achieve regulatory aims. See cases cited, supra note 108.
175. "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country." New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S.
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,J., dissenting).
176. See Rebecca Weber Goldman, A Free Appropriate Education in the Least Restrictive En-
vironment: Promises Made, Promises Broken by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 243, 249 n.60 (1994).
177. Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 377-82 (2001).
178. 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.101-107 (2001).
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deficient. A recent Supreme Court decision (which did not
consider the constitutional issues) illustrates the type of situation
in which states have overlooked the interests of people with
disabilities. In Olmstead v. L.C.,'"9 the Court reviewed the history of
state-imposed institutionalization of individuals with disabilities
and found that the ADA was designed to prohibit "unjustified
isolation" of people with developmental disabilities.'80  Such
isolation can only be undertaken by the state (private parties
cannot mandate that individuals be isolated), and its continuing
existence suggests the inadequacy of state protections for people
with disabilities. 
s
8
Unfortunately, their access to multiple fora is now diminished.
Despite the Court's consistent language proclaiming the impor-
tance of dispersing political power,18 Garrett closes political doors.
In restraining congressional power under Section 5, the Court has
lost sight of its reasons for resurrecting state sovereignty. Once hav-
ing determined that federalism compels limiting congressional
power to abrogate sovereign immunity, 83 the Court then seemed
to rely upon a very constrained reading of Section 1 of the Four-
teenth Amendment,' 4 thereby narrowing the very individual rights
that the Court claims underlie its federalism jurisprudence.
8 5
Thus, in Kimel the Court took pains to affirm the Constitution's
disregard of age-based discrimination,'8 6 and in Garrett'87 the Court
went out of its way to ensure that Cleburne be understood as provid-
ing the lowest level of scrutiny possible for people with
disabilities. '8s Completely overlooked (except in the concurring
opinion's sentimental invocation of concern for the damaging ef-
179. 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
180. Id. at 597.
181. E.g., Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 E3d 325 (1995). For a discussion of the history of in-
stitutionalization as well as the inadequacy of pre-ADA laws to redress the problem, see
Joanne Karger, Note, "Don't Tread on the ADA": Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel Zimning and the Future
of Community Integrationfor Individuals With Disabilities, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1221, 1224-38 (1999).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 167-71.
183. SeeSeminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65-73 (1996).
184. See Kimel v. Florida, 528 U.S. 62, 80-91 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 519-24 (1997).
185. In effect, the Court sacrificed Section l's explicit protections of individual rights
on the altar of the extra-textual protections the Court finds inchoate in the structure of the
Constitution.
186. See528 U.S. at 83-84.
187. 531 U.S. at 366 (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 435, 446
(1985)).
188. This reading of Cleburne was hardly inevitable. Indeed, standard constitutional law
texts often read Cleburne more broadly, as hinting at a more elevated level of scrutiny. See
GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 47, at 728; GEOFFREY STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw
583, 780-84 (3d ed. 1996).
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fects of "prejudice") 8 9 was the individual rights rationale that sup-
posedlyjustified protection of states' rights in the first place' 90
To be sure, the notion that federalism serves as a bulwark
against tyranny seems relatively non-controversial, albeit somewhat
nostalgic.'9 This benign idea, however, has evolved into the con-
siderably more problematic notion that states are inviolate
sovereigns unaccountable even when they breach critical federal
rights. A doctrine that originally developed to preserve dual sover-
eignty and individual freedom has become so concerned about
state sovereignty that it has lost sight of the fact that sovereignty is
split in our federal system and that dual sovereignty requires two
sovereigns: state and federal. Disempowered groups are no more
protected in a regime in which the federal government is power-
less against the sovereignty of the states than they were in a world
in which the states were weakened by an aggrandizement of fed-
eral sovereignty.
V. SEPARATION OF POWERS
For individuals with disabilities, as well as other disempowered
groups, the need for multiple fora extends beyond vertical federal-
ism. Many of the reasons that explain why it is especially important
for the less powerful to be able to make claims before both state
and national government apply with equal force to the need to
access both the federal legislature and the federal judiciary.
The import of judicial protection of minorities is well under-
stood. Indeed, the general proposition was first articulated by
Justice Stone in his famous footnote 4 in Carolene Products.192 In an
opinion the text of which argues that courts in general should be
deferential to Congress, Justice Stone's footnote charges the judi-
ciary with the responsibility of protecting the interests of "discrete
and insular minorities"1 93 because their lack of meaningful access
189. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374-75.
190. In essence, in the name of protecting individual liberty by empowering the states,
the Court is willing to sacrifice individual liberty to the states. The same phenomena are
evident in Morrison, where the Court appears willing to place the interests of raped and
battered women beneath a concern for the states, no matter their ability (or inability) to
protect individuals. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-19 (2000).
191. Brown and Enrich, supra note 13, at 3-4.
192. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
193. Id. at 153 n.4.
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to the political process "may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry.' 1
94
This vision of the judicial role animated approximately fifty
years of individual rights and equal protection jurisprudence.
9 5
Throughout this era the Court's "special role" in protecting the
rights of minorities and other less politically powerful groups was
widely appreciated as justifying the practice of giving "strict scru-
tiny" to legislation that adversely singled out such groups.196
Less appreciated is the fact that the interests of minority groups
have seldom advanced on the basis of judicial protection alone.
While scholars disagree about the degree to which Brown v. Board
of Education actually influenced the desegregation of America,
197
there is a clear scholarly consensus that the dismantling of Jim
Crow required legislative as well as judicial actions.'9 8 Thus, there is
no doubt that the Civil Rights Act of 1964'" and the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 °0 were as critical to the eradication of segregation as
any judicial opinion.
The deleterious role that courts may play with respect to minor-
ity interests has received less attention. While the judiciary's part in
protecting slavery is not debatable, 0' the contemporary Court's
perpetuation of inequality is less frequently discussed. Space pre-
cludes a full cataloging of the Rehnquist Court's actions that have
affirmatively disadvantaged the disempowered, but examples
abound.0 Suffice it to point to the Court's dismantling of legisla-
194. Id.
195. We refer to the period from the New Deal Court to the Rehnquist Court, during
which time the Court engaged in heightened scrutiny of state actions detrimental to the
interests of the politically vulnerable. The most notable examples are Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). See also Sugarman v.
Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (illegitimacy); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 671 (1973)
(gender).
196. The most influential academic articulation of this view is JOHN HART ELY, DEMOC-
RACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
197. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The impact of the Court's decision in Brown, as well as the
scholarship over the same, has recently been reexamined in JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY (2001). For a
powerful critique of Brown's impact, see GERALD ROSENBERG, HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
198. See PATTERSON, supra note 197, at 136-37.
199. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
200. 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1994).
201. The most infamous example is, of course, Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
202. E.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (finding federal af-
firmative action program unconstitutional); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993) (upholding
right of INS to detain children); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489
U.S. 189 (1989) (state has no obligation under the Fourteenth Amendment to protect a
child from severe abuse); Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450 (1988) (school
system does not violate constitution by charging for transportation to school).
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tively enacted affirmative action plans °3 as well as its renunciation
of the clear legislative history demanding a broad reading of the
ADA.0 4 Clearly this Supreme Court is no special friend of the po-
litically vulnerable.
This reality underscores the importance of multiple federal fora
for the articulation of minority claims. Indeed, this was part of the
Court's reasoning for rejecting suspect classification status for
people with disabilities in Cleburne.°5 The Cleburne Court upheld
the plaintiff's claim but refused to apply strict scrutiny because it
felt that the legislature was better suited (and had more ably
served) to advance the interests of those with disabilities. 26
This model of deference to the legislative role was soundly re-
jected in Boerne. °7 Writing for the majority in that case, Justice
Kennedy severely chastised Congress for overreaching its authority,
essentially holding that Congress is constitutionally impotent to
remediate violations not previously identified by the Court.
20 8
This insistence upon judicial primacy-dare we say
sovereignty-was reiterated in both Kimel 2°9 and Morrison.2 0 Garrett
was even more emphatic. As a statute, the ADA was notable for its
extensive, published legislative history.2 1 ' There was an extra-
ordinary legislative record including numerous hearings and
multiple committee reports.212 Had the Court followed the promise
the majority made in Lopez to defer to congressional findings,2 0 or
had the Court recalled Chief Justice Marshall's reminder
that legislation "plainly adapted" to a constitutional end is
constitutional,2 4 the ADA surely would have been affirmed as a
203. See Adarand, 515 U.S. 200; City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989). A more subtle example of the Court's changing attitude toward civil rights claims is
the motivation-driven definition of discrimination first developed by the Burger Court in
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), which made it virtually impossible for civil rights
plaintiffs to prevail.
204. Wendy E. Parmet, Plain Meaning and Mitigating Measures: Judicial Interpretations of
the Meaning of Disability, 21 BERKELEYJ. Emp. & LAB. L. 53, 76-78 (2000) (discussing fact that
in interpreting the ADA's definition of disability, the Court chose to disregard the statute's
legislative history).
205. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
206. Id. at 443-45.
207. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
208. Id. at 519-29; Brown & Enrich, supra note 13, at 36 n.197.
209. 528 U.S. at 81-84.
210. 529 U.S. at 619-22.
211. Parmet, supra note 204, at 64-66.
212. See id.
213. 514 U.S. at 562-63; Brown and Enrich, supra note 13, at 40 (requirement of con-
gressional findings equally relevant to Commerce Clause and Section 5).
214. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
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proper exercise of Congress' power to remediate irrational
discrimination against people with disabilities.
But in Garrett the Court made it clear that Congress will receive
absolutely no deference when it acts pursuant to Section 52 5 To
the contrary, the Garrett majority, while trumpeting its constitu-
tional duty, engaged in a remarkably skeptical and searching
review of the legislative record. While acknowledging that the "re-
cord assembled by Congress includes many instances to support"
216
the preamble's finding that there has been a history of discrimina-
tion against people with disabilities, the Court quickly dismissed
that record as not sufficiently tied to the problems as defined by
the Court. First, the Court noted that the record included exam-
ples of discrimination by cities 7 and other actors not properly
considered to be the state. In effect, then, the Court required that
Congress prepare a special set of findings limited to actions under-
taken exclusively by states and not their subdivisions. Second, the
Court found that the legislative history included acts of discrimina-
tion that may not have been "irrational under our decision in
Cleburne."2 8 These findings, in effect, were discarded as not worthy
of supporting congressional action.
Finally, the Court found that Congress had failed to demon-
strate a sufficiently pervasive pattern of discrimination. 9 Pointing
to South Carolina v. Katzenbach220 as an example of congressional
legislation narrowly tailored to apply to those specific states in
which there was a long and documented history of constitutional
violations, the Garrett Court suggested that the ADA was infirm be-
cause of its overbreadth . In effectively demanding that Congress
215. This outcome is true despite Justice Rehnquist's statement that "Congress is not
limited to mere legislative repetition of this Court's constitutional jurisprudence." Garrett,
531 U.S. 356 at 365. That statement in the opinion is quickly undermined by the Court's
reiteration that "it is the responsibility of this Court, not Congress, to define the substance
of constitutional guarantees." Id. (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-24
(1997)).
216. Id. at 369.
217. Id.; note 99, supra.
218. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370. This suggests that contrary to Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 641 (1966), and even to Boerne, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), Congress may never prohibit acts
that are not in themselves unconstitutional under the Court's definition. In the part of Mor-
gan cited with approval in Boerne, the Court suggested that in order to prevent
unconstitutional acts by states, Congress could prohibit other acts that were not themselves
unconstitutional. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518. That possibility was simply never considered by the
Garrett Court. The Garrett majority did not ask how rational discrimination may lead to irra-
tional discrimination. Instead Garrett demanded that Congress rest exclusively upon
findings of irrational discrimination. Garrett, 531 U.S. 368-73.
219. Id. at 370-74.
220. 383 U.S. 301 (1965).
221. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 373.
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narrowly tailor its legislation to the specific states and circum-
stances in which there were documented violations of the
Constitution, the Court treated the legislative branch like a lower
court who imposed an overly broad injunction. As Justice Breyer
noted in dissent, the Court essentially imposed a standard of strict
scrutiny upon the ADA, even though the ADA did not violate any
of the rights that traditionally trigger heightened review. The irony
is that the only legislation that may survive this elevated review
(which demands a close if not perfect correlation between acts of
Congress and judicially determined violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment) may be laws that apply to those classifications that
the Court has termed "suspect."2 2 3 Yet when Congress legislates
with respect to those groups, the suspect status of the classification
triggers strict scrutiny under the Fifth Amendment, resulting in a
different demand for "congruence, 224 which has all too often been
"fatal in fact."225 One is left wondering what Congress can do under
Section 5, other than to pass a law enforcing a judicial decree. In
effect, the legislature has been left a very junior partner in the task
of protecting the powerless. As a result, only one forum remains to
protect the vulnerable: the Court.
That the Court views itself as the truly inviolate sovereign be-
came especially apparent in Bush v. Gore.226 This Article is not the
place to fully critique the logical and doctrinal aberrations of that
case. 227 Suffice it to say that the decision by the same five justices
who constituted the Garrett majority to abruptly halt Florida's
presidential vote recount casts grave doubt upon that majority's
professed commitment to the sovereign power of the states to ad-
minister and interpret their own laws.2 8 For a majority that had
222. As Justice Breyer aptly noted: "the Congress of the United States is not a lower
court." Id. at 383 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
223. Kimel specifically singled out race and gender classifications for this treatment. 528
U.S. at 83. For further discussion of this point see Brown and Enrich, supra note 13, at 53.
224. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (requiring that fed-
eral regulations giving a preference to a racial minority must meet a test of congruence).
225. Id. at 237.
226. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
227. Many scholars have debated Bush v. Gore. For an example of their arguments, see
Symposium: Bush v. Gore, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 613 (2001).
228. Throughout much of English history, the "sovereign" picked the prime minister. It
is in this sense that ChiefJustice Marshall in McCuUoch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819), asserted that the people would be sovereign for they selected the Constitution and
its government. In Bush we discover that the Court picks the government. While sovereignty
has no singular meaning, see supra text accompanying notes 125-28, the power to select
those who administer the state comes as close to a defining attribute of sovereignty as we
know.
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repeatedly proclaimed the sovereignty of states, and that was about
to expand state sovereignty in Garrett, to stay a state court's ordered
recount of a vote, and then to determine on its own, at the elev-
enth hour, that there was no time to remedy any constitutional
violations29 raises enormous questions about the import and sig-
nificance of the Court's federalism agenda.
After Bush v. Gore, the Court's commitment to state sovereignty
must be re-examined. It is difficult to reconcile the Court that so
directly and disruptively involved itself in a state election, with the
Court that a few weeks later relied on state sovereignty to overturn
a major civil rights law.230 Does the Court's willingness to sacrifice
civil rights claims on the altar of state sovereignty reflect respect
for the sovereignty of the states, or does it more truly impose the
sovereignty of the Court itself?
Taken together, Garrett and Bush v. Gore make inescapable the
possibility that the Court's sovereign immunity doctrine is more
about the Court's assertion of its own sovereignty than about con-
cern for the states. After these cases, the only remaining forum for
people with disabilities, as well as other disadvantaged groups, is
the Court, and that body evidences substantial hostility to their
claims.
CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that structural concerns lie at the heart of
constitutionalism. Respect for the states, as well as acceptance of
judicial review, are critical to the protection of individuals and vul-
nerable groups. But like any set of norms, carried to excess, they
threaten to eviscerate the very values they were meant to serve.
So has been the fate of the myth of sovereignty: both judicial
and state. Unleashed from their textual and historic moorings, the
Court has permitted these myths to destroy critical political safe-
guards. In Garrett, the victims were state workers with disabilities.
Tomorrow the same result is likely to befall all individuals with dis-
229. Bush, 531 U.S. at 111.
230. Notably, the Bush Court found an equal protection violation without any finding of
discrimination, irrational or otherwise. Id. at 104-08. Clearly, the Court gave itself far
greater latitude to depart from precedent and interpret the Equal Protection Clause crea-
tively, than it was willing to give Congress in Garrett. Remarkable, too, is the absence of any
citation or consideration of Bush in Garrett.
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abilities affected by state action.23' Thereafter, other civil rights laws
may crumble 232 as the Court proclaims l'tat, c'est moi.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 101-08.
232. See cases cited, supra note 108. Other federal statutes vulnerable to the analysis in
Garrett include the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994), which was
found unconstitutional to the extent that it applies to states by the Fifth Circuit in its opin-
ion in Garrett, 193 E3d at 1219, and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1994), the
constitutionality of which was questioned in Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 402 n.2 (7th
Cir. 1999).
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